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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shane McKay appeals from the district court's order denying his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlyina Criminal Proceedinas 
"While awaiting a court date for a previous arrest for driving under the 
influence, and while driving with a suspended license, Shane McKay drove at an 
estimated speed of seventy miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone 
and struck a motorcycle from behind, killing the operator of the motorcycle." 
State v. McKay, Docket No. 31652, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 727 (Idaho 
App. Nov. 22, 2006), review denied January 12, 2007. The state charged McKay 
with, and the jury convicted him of, vehicular manslaughter and the district court 
imposed a unified ten-year sentence with four years fixed. McKay, 2006 
Unpublished Opinion No. 727, p.1. McKay filed a Rule 35 motion, which the 
district court denied. Id. 
McKay appealed challenging the length of his sentence and the denial of 
Rule 35 relief. The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed McKay's conviction and 
sentence. Id. at p.2. The Remittitur issued on April 25, 2002, the same day the 
ldaho Supreme Court denied McKay's petition for review. (File Folder in No. 
31652.) 
Course Of Post Conviction Proceedings 
McKay, through counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging 
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's failure to 
request an instruction on "cause," and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failing to raise "any other issues on direct appeal" other than 
excessive sentence and the district court's failure to grant Rule 35 relief. (R., 
Vol.1, pp.2-4.) McKay further explained the nature of these claims in his 
Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Specifically, McKay argued (1) trial counsel's failure to ask the district court to 
give the pattern instruction for vehicular manslaughter, lCJl 709, or include 
certain language from the pattern instruction in the elements instruction given to 
the jury, was deficient and prejudicial because without such an instruction, the 
jury was permitted to convict him of a "strict liability offense" (R., Vol. I, pp.16-19); 
and (2) appellate counsel should have challenged the elements instruction on 
direct appeal (R., Vol. I, pp.21-28). 
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal of McKay's 
petition under I.C. Fj 19-4906(c). (R., Vol. I, pp.43-45, 49-50; R., Vol. II, pp.137- 
221.) McKay filed a "Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition" and supporting 
memorandum. (R., Vol. !I, pp.222-31.) After hearing the parties' argument on 
their cross-motions for summary disposition, the district court denied McKay's 
petition for post-conviction relief and granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, concluding McKay was not entitled to relief on either claim because 
the elements instruction given was appropriate and actually increased the state's 
burden of proof. (R., Vol. II, pp.241-42, 293-94; Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.31, L.6.) 
McKay timely appealed. (R., Vol. 11, pp.283-84.) 
ISSUE 
McKay states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. McKay's 
post-conviction application because the jury instructions omitted the 
element of cause and that element was at issue? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has McKay failed to establish the district court erred in denying his petition 
for post-conviction relief in light of McKay's failure to demonstrate that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Concluded McKav Was Not Entitled to Relief On 
Either Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
A. Introduction 
McKay contends the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post- 
conviction relief because, he argues, both trial and appellate counsel were 
ineffective for failing to challenge the elements instruction given in his underlying 
criminal case. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.5-19.) More specifically, McKay 
complains that the elements instruction should have been challenged because it 
deviated from the pattern instruction, ICJl 709, in such a way that it allowed the 
jury to convict him without requiring the state to prove adequate causation. 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12.) McKay's claim fails because the elements 
instruction was not misleading or prejudicial and there was no basis for 
challenging the instruction at trial or on appeal. As a result, McKay cannot 
establish either of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). An appellate court will 
disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review 
the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. 
!3&te, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). If the district court 
has not made explicit factual findings, the appellate court will extrapolate the 
implicit findings from the record and uphold them unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous. State v. Whiteley, 124 ldaho 261,268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 
(Ct. App. 1993). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not 
met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 
939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990); Larkin v. State, 115 ldaho 72, 74, 
764 P.2d 439,441 (Ct. App. 1988). 
C. Standards Governing Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
petitioner must demonstrate that ( I )  counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The Strickland standard applies 
to both trial and appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell 
v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on 
the prejudice prong in relation to appellate counsel is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the petitioner would have 
prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the 
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes ''trial counsel was competent and 
that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 
772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's strategic and tactical 
decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post- 
conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA petitioner 
has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v. 
State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunninaham v. State, 117 
ldaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional 
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a 
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might 
have been tried better." lvev v. State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 
(1992). 
D. McKay Has Failed To Establish He Received Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel From Either Trial Or Appellate Counsel 
McKay complains both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for 
failing to challenge the elements instruction given at trial on the ground that the 
instruction failed to include the words "in an unlawful manner" and "significant," 
which are included in the pattern instruction, lCJl 709. Both of McKay's claims 
fail because the instruction did not mislead the jury or otherwise prejudice 
McKay. Indeed, the instruction given elevated the state's burden of proof with 
respect to cause. 
Whether an attorney is ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions 
depends on whether the instructions contained errors. Brown v. State, 137 ldaho 
529, 533, 50 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2002). Jury instructions contain errors 
when they fail, as a whole, to fairly and adequately present the issues and state 
the applicable law. Id.; State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 
(1996); State v. Canelo, 129 ldaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct. App. 
1996). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have misled 
the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310, 
955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); m, 137 ldaho at 533, 50 P.3d at 1028. Where, 
as here, a petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to request an 
instruction, the petitioner must demonstrate not only that the instructions given 
were inadequate (deficient performance), but also that there is a reasonable 
probability that the jury's verdict would have been different had the proposed 
instruction been given (prejudice). m, 137 ldaho at 534, 50 P.3d at 1029. 
Applying these standards to the facts of this case reveals that McKay failed to 
establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal. 
1. ldaho Criminal Jury Instruction 709 -Vehicular Manslaughter 
The pattern criminal jury instruction for vehicular manslaughter states: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of ldaho 
3. the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or 
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol]; [and] 
14. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence; and] 
[4] 151. The defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in such 
unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to the death 
of [name of decedent(@]. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert 
description of misdemeanor or infraction] [driving while under the 
influence of alcohol] is committed when all of the following are 
found to exist: 
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions] 
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the state 
has proven each of the above, including each component of the 
unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or infraction] 
[driving while under the influence of alcohol] beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of vehicular 
manslaughter. 
(ICJI 709 (brackets in original).) 
2. The Jun/ Instruction Given In This Case On The Elements Of 
Vehicular Manslaughter 
The state charged McKay with vehicular manslaughter in violation of I.C. 
§§ 18-4006(3)(b) and 18-4007(3)(a) and specifically alleged McKay committed 
the offense "by operating a motor vehicle . . . under the influence of alcohol 
andlor with a blood alcohol content in excess of .08, or 18-8006, IdahoCode [sic] 
which caused [Ted Cox's] death." (#31652 R., Vol. I, pp.69-70.) Section 18- 
4006(3)(b), I.C., defines vehicular manslaughter as: 
18-4006. Manslaughter defined. - Manslaughter is the unlawful 
killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human 
embryo or fetus, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds: 
3. Vehicular - in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a 
significant cause contributing to the death because of: 
(b) the commission of a violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, 
ldaho Code . . . 
Section 18-8006, I.C., provides, in relevant part, "Any person causing 
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any 
person other than himself in committing, a violation of the provisions of section 
18-8004(1)(a) or (l)(c), ldaho Code," is guilty of aggravated driving under the 
influence. I.C. 3 18-8006(1). Section 18-8004(1)(a)', I.C., in turn makes it 
unlawful "to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this 
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private 
property open to the public," while "under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any 
other intoxicating substances . . . or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 . . . 
or more . . .." Thus, in order to prove McKay was guilty of vehicular 
manslaughter pursuant to I.C. 3 184006(3)(b), the state was required to prove 
McKay was operating his car in violation of I.C. 3 18-8004(1)(a) and the 
operation of his vehicle in that manner was a "significant cause contributing" to 
Ted's death. 
Accordingly, at trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of 
vehicular manslaughter as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, as charged in the information, the state must prove 
each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 
' Sections 18-8004(1)(a) and 18-8004(1)(c), I.C., are essentially identical with the 
exception of the type of vehicle driven - (a) applies to motor vehicles whereas (c) 
applies to commercial motor vehicles. The provisions of I.C. 3 18-8004(1)(a) 
apply to this case because McKay was driving a personal vehicle, not a 
commercial motor vehicle. 
1. On or about the 5'h day of October, 2003, 
2. In the state of Idaho, Canyon County, 
3. the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actual 
physical control of 
4. a motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private 
property open to the public, 
6. while under the influence of alcohol 
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by 
analysis of defendant's blood, 
7. and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused 
the death of Ted Cox. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. If 
each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., Vol. I, p.68 (Instruction No. 201A) (emphasis in original).) 
3. McKay Has Failed To Establish Trial Counsel Was Deficient In 
Failing To Obiect To The Vehicular Manslaushter Instruction 
On appeal, McKay argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he 
"fail[ed] to argue that the district court erred" in giving an elements instruction on 
vehicular manslaughter that did not include the words "in such unlawful manner" 
or "significant," which are used in ICJl 709. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.6- 
12.) McKay's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim fails because trial 
counsel, in fact, requested the "in such an unlawful manner" language and his 
failure to include "significant" in his proposed instruction was beneficial to McKay 
in that the failure to include "significant" actually raised the state's burden. 
The proposed elements instruction submitted by trial counsel did include 
the language "in an unlawful manner." The proposed instruction reads: 
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following: 
I On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of ldaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a 
motor vehicle committed the unlawful act of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful 
manner caused the death of Theodore Cox. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol is committed when all of the 
following are found to exist: 
1. That on or about October 5, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of ldaho; 
3. The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle; 
4. Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or 
private property open to the public; 
5. While under the influence of alcohol and/or who has 
an alcohol concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of 
his blood. urine or breath. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.85-86 (emphasis added).) 
Because counsel requested the "in an unlawful manner" language McKay 
claims he was entitled to, McKay cannot establish ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on this basis. That the court ultimately did not instruct the jury as 
requested by counsel is not an ineffective assistance of claim. Rather, it is a 
substantive claim that should have been raised on direct appeal and, as such, is 
precluded from consideration in post-conviction. I.C. § 19-4901 ("Any issue 
which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may 
not be considered in post-conviction proceedings . . ..") 
McKay has likewise failed to establish that trial counsel's failure to request 
the "significant cause" language in his proposed instruction was ineffective 
because, as noted by the district court, the language requested by trial counsel, 
and given by the district court, actually increased the state's burden by requiring 
the state to prove that McKay's act of driving under the influence caused Ted's 
death, rather than just proving it was a "significant cause contributing to" his 
death, as stated in lCJl 709. 
McKay nevertheless challenges the district court's conclusion, claiming 
"the jury could have interpreted 'caused' to mean 'a cause"' rather than "the 
cause," which, he contends would have "permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay 
guilty if it concluded his operation of the motor vehicle was a factor contributing to 
the cause of death." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.11-12.) McKay's claim fails. 
The plain, ordinary meaning of "caused" and the definition of "caused" is "to be 
the cause of; bring about." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 
93 (1996) (emphasis added). It is presumed that jurors interpret words of 
common usage in the sense in which they are generally understood. See State 
v. Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740, 741, I01 P.3d 233, 234 (Ct. App. 2004), review 
denied, (citations omitted). As such, it should be presumed that the jury in 
McKay's criminal case interpreted the elements instruction as requiring it to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of driving under the 
influence was the cause of Ted's death not just "a factor contributing to" the 
cause of death, as argued by McKay. 
McKay's argument that the legislative history for the vehicular 
manslaughter statute somehow renders the language of the jury instruction 
confusing is without merit. In 1997, the legislature amended the vehicular 
manslaughter statute as follows: 
18-4006. MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED. Manslaughter is the 
unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three (3) 
kinds: 
3. Vehicular - - in which the operation of a motor vehicle 
is a sianificant cause contributing to the death because of: 
1997 ldaho Sess. Laws, ch. 103, § 1, p.244.' 
The introductory language to the amendment reads: "AN ACT RELATING 
TO MANSLAUGHTER; AMENDING SECTION 18-4006, IDAHO CODE, TO 
REDEFINE VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER BY PROVIDING A BROADER 
STANDARD OF PROOF" (id.) and the Statement of Purpose accompanying the 
amendment provides: 
This legislation is intended to clarify the definition of vehicular 
manslaughter contained in ldaho Code, Section 18-4006. The 
The legislature amended I.C. $ 18-4006 again in 2002 to add the language 
"including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus," in the definition of 
manslaughter. 2002 ldaho Sess. Laws, ch. 330, 5 2, p.936. 
statute as it presently reads has created confusion and resulted in 
inconsistent interpretations amongst trial judges as well as juries. 
The proposed change will make it clear that driving under the 
influence may still result in a finding of guilt for vehicular 
manslaughter even though other causes, such as weather or 
lighting, may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle 
accident which resulted in death. 
H.B. 143, Statement of Purpose. 
McKay argues the legislature's acknowledgement of "inconsistent 
interpretations" in relation to the statute's use of the word "causes" supports his 
claim that "the jury could have interpreted 'caused' to mean 'a cause' and that 
interpretation permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty if it concluded his 
operation of the motor vehicle was a factor contributing to the cause of death." 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.12.) The mere fact that there were "inconsistent 
interpretations" of the word "causes" prior to the amendment does not establish 
that McKay's interpretation is a reasonable or even likely one. To the contrary, 
the introductory language to the amendment noting the intent to provide a 
"broader standard of proof," and that portion of the Statement of Purpose 
"mak[ing] it clear that driving under the influence may still result in a finding of 
guilt for vehicular manslaughter even though other causes such as weather or 
lighting may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle accident which 
resulted in death," indicates judges and juries were interpreting "causes" to 
preclude a conviction where "other causes . . . may have in some way 
contributed." While that particular interpretation of "causes" is understandable 
and reasonable, McKay's interpretation, which is the exact opposite, is not. 
4. McKav Has Failed To Establish Appellate Counsel Was Deficient 
For Failing To Challenge The Vehicular Manslauahter Instruction 
On Appeal 
McKay also claims appellate counsel was deficient for "failing to argue that 
the vehicular manslaughter instruction constituted fundamental error." (Opening 
Brief of Appellant, p.15.) McKay's claim fails for two reasons. 
First, with respect to McKay's argument that the jury instruction should 
have included the words "significant cause" rather than "caused," appellate 
counsel was precluded from raising such an argument for the first time on appeal 
given that McKay's proposed elements instruction also used the word "caused" 
rather than significant cause. Thus, any error in the instruction in relation to that 
particular word was invited and cannot be considered on appeal even under the 
doctrine of fundamental error. State v. Walters, 120 ldaho 46, 60, 813 P.2d 857, 
871 (1990) ("Since the defense counsel made a conscious decision not to object, 
any claim of error, fundamental or otherwise, was invited and cannot be the basis 
for a claim of error on appeal.") (citations omitted); State v. Caudill, 109 ldaho 
222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) ("We will not reverse for the reason that one 
may not successfully complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. 
In other words, invited errors are not reversible.") 
Second, appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the 
vehicular manslaughter instruction because it did not include the words "in such 
unlawful manner" because the absence of those words did not render the 
instruction incorrect, mislead the jury or otherwise prejudice McKay. McKay 
claims otherwise, arguing, by omitting the phrase "in such unlawful manner," "the 
jury was not required to link Mr. McKay's culpable conduct with the death of Mr. 
Cox and the state was relieved of its burden to prove every element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.10-I I .) 
To the contrary, the instruction given clearly advised the jury the state was 
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's "operation of the 
motor vehicle" "while under the influence of alcohol while having an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of defendant's blood" 
"caused the death of Ted Cox." (R., Vol. I, p.68 (Instruction No. 201A (emphasis 
in original).) This is only an incorrect statement of the law in that it imposes a 
greater burden on the state because it required proof that McKay's "culpable 
conduct," i.e., driving under the influence, was the cause of Ted's death rather 
than a "significant factor contributing to" Ted's death. As such, the instruction 
was not prejudicjal or misleading and it did not, as McKay claims, relieve the 
state from proving McKay's culpable conduct was "linked" to Ted's death. 
5. McKav Has Failed To Establish He Was Prejudiced By Either 
Attornev's Failure To Challenge The Vehicular Manslauqhter 
Instruction 
McKay has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsels' 
failure to challenge the vehicular manslaughter instruction not only because the 
instruction given actually increased the state's burden but because the evidence 
at trial established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of 
driving under the influence "was a significant cause contributing to" Ted's death. 
McKay was driving erratically at a high rate of speed, at one point crossing 
into the lane of oncoming traffic, right before he plowed into Ted's motorcycle, 
which had slowed down in order to cross some railroad tracks. (#31652 Tr., 
p.144, L.14 - p.146, L.24, p.181, L.12 - p.182, L.18, p.391, Ls.8-19, p.404, L.19 
- p.405, L.2, p.576, Ls.10-17, p.581, I - 1  p.583, Ls.1-5, p.588, Ls.8-25, 
p.589, Ls.15-24.) When police responded to the accident, they noticed McKay 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. (#31652 Tr., p.325, Ls.17-19, 
p.326, Ls.2-8, p.480, Ls.21-24.) McKay's speech was slurred, his eyes were 
glassy and bloodshot, and he smelled of alcohol. (#31652 Tr., p.326, Ls.10-13, 
p.480, Ls.14-20.) McKay admitted drinking (#31652 Tr., p.485, Ls.1-3) and 
testing revealed his blood alcohol content was . I 5  (#31652 Tr., p.504, Ls.24-25), 
nearly twice the legal limit. I.C. § 18-8004(l)(a). 
McKay nevertheless claims he was prejudiced by the jury instruction 
because, he contends, "[slufficient evidence was introduced at trial from which 
the jury could have found that Mr. Cox did not have an operational taillight and 
that Mr. McKay's commission of DUI did not cause Mr. Cox's death." (Opening 
Brief of Appellant, p.14.) McKay's argument fails because whether Ted's taillight 
was malfunctioning does not mean the jury would have concluded McKay's 
unlawful act of driving under the influence was not a "significant cause 
contributing" to Ted's death. Indeed, the evidence at trial indicates otherwise. 
Moreover, the evidence that Ted's taillight was not working is suspect and 
was contradicted by eyewitness testimony. The only evidence McKay offered to 
support his argument that Ted's taillight was not working was that of a hired 
expert, Brant Freeman, who claimed Ted's motorcycle had no taillight because if 
there was a taillight he would have expected to "find a small speck or something 
of that plastic taillight lens embedded into the radiator or something like that," but 
did not. (#31652 Tr., p.705, Ls.8-11.) Freeman's testimony was, however, 
contradicted by Monique Crownhart, Michael Warren, and Scott Paulson, who 
were with Ted that night he was killed and testified that Ted's motorcycle had a 
functioning taillight just prior to the accident. (#31652 Tr., p.168, L . l  - p.176, 
L . l l ,  p.209, L.17 - p.214, L.6, p.261, L.21 - p.264, L.24.) Furthermore, 
Freeman's testimony about how the accident occurred was contradicted by two 
other accident reconstructionists - Fred Rice (#31652 Tr., pp.559-593, pp.820- 
828) and Edward Robertson (#31652 Tr., pp.745-795). 
In light of the evidence presented, there is no reasonable probability that 
McKay would have been acquitted had the jury been provided with an instruction 
which included "in such unlawful manner" or "significant cause." The state clearly 
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of driving under 
the influence was a significant cause contributing to Ted's death. 
Having failed to show either deficient performance or resulting prejudice 
on the part of trial or appellate counsel in relation to the vehicular manslaughter 
instruction, McKay has also failed to show any basis for reversal of the district 
court's order denying his request for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying post-conviction relief 
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